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INTRODUCTION 
On September 16, 2007 the U.S. private military company 
(“PMC”) Blackwater engaged in a shootout in an Iraqi marketplace 
that left dozens of people dead.1 The controversy resulting from the 
incident underlined the fact that although PMCs have operated in 
Iraq since the 2003 invasion, the laws applicable to their operations 
have never been clear.2 Blackwater, for instance, is no stranger to 
 1. See Adam Zagorin & Brian Bennett, Iraq Limits Blackwater's Operations, 
TIME.COM, Sept. 17, 2007, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,166 
2586,00.html (discussing the Iraqi government’s effort to suspend Blackwater’s 
license to operate in Iraq after the marketplace shooting). 
 2. See Alissa J. Rubin & Paul von Zielbauer, The Judgement Gap In a Case 
like the Blackwater Shootings, There Are Many Laws but More Obstacles, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2007, at A1 (noting that the laws applying to private security 
contractors abroad are so convoluted that there have been no prosecutions of 
American contractors in Iraq for acts of violence). But see Michael R. Gordon, 
U.S. Charges Contractor at Iraq Post in Stabbing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2008, at A6 
(reporting that a contractor with Canadian and Iraqi citizenship will be charged 
under U.S. law for the first time since 1968 representing that for the first time 
recently expanded military jurisdiction over contractors will be tested); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-966, REBUILDING IRAQ: DOD AND STATE 
DEPARTMENT HAVE IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND COORDINATION OF PRIVATE 
SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ, BUT FURTHER ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO 
SUSTAIN IMPROVEMENTS 28 (2008) (reporting that on June 22, 2008, the contractor 
was tried under the UCMJ and sentenced to five months confinement). 
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controversy over its role in Iraq.3 At the time of the September 
incident, U.S. lawmakers had already proposed new laws to address 
the problems in holding U.S. private military companies like 
Blackwater accountable for their actions overseas.4 Yet weeks after 
the Blackwater shooting, guards working for Unity Resources Group, 
an Australian-run private security firm based in Dubai and registered 
in Singapore, killed two more Iraqi civilians.5 This second incident 
 3. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 110th 
Cong., PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: AN EXAMINATION OF 
BLACKWATER’S ACTIONS IN FALLUJAH 4 (2007) (reporting on February 2007 
Committee Hearings over the company’s involvement in a widely-reported 
Fallujah incident that left four Blackwater employees dead); Staff of H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong., Memorandum: Additional 
Information about Blackwater USA, 1-3 (2007) (providing background to the 
Committee before October 2007 hearings about Blackwater’s actions in Iraq, 
including the U.S. government’s failure to prosecute a drunken Blackwater 
employee who killed an Iraqi guard, and Blackwater’s involvement in at least 195 
shooting incidents since 2005). The memorandum also notes that Blackwater has at 
times joined coalition forces in military actions, including reinforcing machine gun 
positions, providing reinforcements for U.S. Army forces, and firing from 
helicopters. Id. at 8-9. 
 4. See generally Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security 
Contracting Act of 2007, S. 674, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007) (requiring federal 
agencies to provide details to Congress on PMCs operating in Iraq within ninety 
days after enactment of the Act); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2008, S. 1547, 110th Cong. (2007) (directing the Secretary of Defense to 
issue regulations for PMCs operating in a combat area); Transparency and 
Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007, H.R. 369, 110th 
Cong. § 4 (2007) (extending the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
(“MEJA”) to contractors working for any federal agency in the same area as 
military forces are operating); Iraq Contracting Fraud Review Act of 2007,  
H.R. 528, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (asking the Secretary of Defense to audit all Iraq 
contracts involving reconstruction or military support); New Direction for Iraq Act 
of 2007, H.R. 663, 110th Cong. § 204(c)-(d) (2007) (calling for an examination of 
contracts awarded by the U.S. government to conduct activities in Iraq for 
evidence of war profiteering); Iraq and Afghanistan Contractor Sunshine Act,  
H.R. 897, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007) (ordering federal agencies to provide copies 
of all Iraq and Afghanistan contracts over $5 million to Congress); MEJA 
Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007) 
(extending the MEJA to contractors working for any federal agency in the same 
area as military forces are operating, and requiring the FBI set up a Theater Task 
Force to investigate any misconduct); Providing for Operation Iraqi Freedom Cost 
Accountability, H.R. Res. 97, 110th Cong. (2007) (establishing an ongoing 
commission to investigate contracts involving Iraq). 
 5. See Andrew E. Kramer & James Glanz, U.S. Guards Kill 2 Iraqi Women in 
New Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, at A1 (reporting that the security 
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highlights the global nature of the private military and security 
industry and the international problem of holding PMCs 
accountable.6 This global issue demands an international regulatory 
framework to supplement domestic laws and hold foreign firms like 
Unity Resources accountable for acts of violence. 
The international community has already attempted to define 
“mercenaries” with both Article 47 of the 1977 Protocol I Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions (“Article 47”)7 and the 1989 U.N. 
Convention on Mercenaries (“U.N. Convention”).8 However, it is not 
clear that the terms of Article 47 and the U.N. Convention can 
capture PMCs as “mercenaries, therefore PMCs continue to go 
unregulated.”9 The list of criteria under both international definitions 
is so long that one commentator has stated “any mercenary who 
cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to be shot – and 
his lawyer with him.”10 Furthermore, while the use of PMCs is 
widespread and accepted in the international community, PMCs are 
only regulated, if at all, by domestic laws.11 Thus, there is a pressing 
need for a new international convention focusing on private military 
and security assistance in order to truly address the global problem 
with private military firms. 
company opened fire on a car, killing two women inside, as the vehicle approached 
a convoy). The security company, Unity Resources Group, worked for RTI 
International, which in turn was in Iraq on a U.S. State Department contract. Id. 
 6. Cf. FRED ROSEN, CONTRACT WARRIORS: HOW MERCENARIES CHANGED 
HISTORY AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM 143 (2005) (noting that a PMC will have 
offices in many different countries and openly advertise their ability to deploy to 
any global danger zone). 
 7. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 
art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu3/b/93.htm [hereinafter Protocol Additional]. 
 8. International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries, G.A. Resolution 44/34, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. 
No. 43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989) (entered into force Oct. 20, 2001), 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/mercenaries.htm [hereinafter U.N. 
Convention]. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 328 & 374-75 n.83 (1980) 
(discussing the inherent weaknesses in the international definitions of 
mercenaries). 
 11. See infra Part I (noting that PMCs operate worldwide, but few countries 
have laws specifically addressing them). 
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Part I of this Comment will discuss the history of mercenaries and 
the rise of PMCs, and the existing international agreements and 
customary international law. Part II will argue that PMCs can escape 
the international agreements on mercenaries because the 
requirements in the definitions are cumulative, so a PMC may escape 
the whole definition by virtue of avoiding just one clause. However, 
Part II will further argue that because the international agreements do 
not have worldwide support, other sources of international law are 
more significant. Part II will also examine practices among differing 
nations, and argue that PMCs have clearly defined roles as legitimate 
support entities distinct from mercenaries. Lastly, Part III will 
recommend a new international convention that better reflects 
international practice regarding PMCs. This Convention will create 
an international registry and a licensing system overseen by an 
international body. Simply leaving the problem to domestic laws, as 
the United States has done in the past, has failed to capture the truly 
multinational corporations.12 Only through a global regulatory 
regime can the global problem be addressed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The international community accepted the widespread use of 
mercenaries as auxiliary forces in the past, but there has been a shift 
against mercenaries in recent decades.13 In response to the 
destabilizing effects of mercenaries in Africa, some members of the 
international community condemned mercenaries for hindering the 
self determination efforts of emerging African states.14 However, 
while the international community wrestled with the problems of 
mercenaries, unregulated PMCs emerged on the world stage.15
 12. See infra Part II (discussing the inability of U.S. domestic laws to touch 
foreign nationals working for PMCs in Iraq). 
 13. See LEONARD GAULTIER ET AL., THE MERCENARY ISSUE AT THE UN 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH 16 (2001) 
(noting that the international community had always accepted the legitimacy of 
mercenaries, at least until controversy erupted with the use of mercenaries by 
many sides during post-World War II decolonization in Africa). 
 14. See id. at 16-17 (describing U.N. efforts encouraging states to restrict the 
use of mercenaries through a number of Resolutions and the drafting of the U.N. 
Convention on Mercenaries). 
 15. See ROSEN, supra note 6, at 11 (noting that unlike temporary mercenary 
bands in Africa, PMCs continue to have a business identity long after a conflict is 
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A. HISTORY OF MERCENARIES 
The traditional definition of a mercenary was one who accepts 
money or some benefit for military service.16 From the beginning of 
recorded history, mercenaries have supplemented military forces.17 
Indeed, it was only relatively recently in human history that the state 
became the sole legal authority with a monopoly on armed force.18 
Before the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, anyone with enough money 
could raise an army.19 However, after 1648 the concept of standing 
armies made up of citizens loyal to the nation-state developed.20 Yet 
even in the modern state-based system, it remained customary to 
supplement national standing armies with hired support.21
over). 
 16. See JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 228 (1993) (describing 
mercenaries as military professionals who sell their services for money or other 
compensation such as property, citizenship, or preferential treatment). 
 17. See id. at 231-32 (describing the historical market system of mercenaries as 
far back as the Hellenistic Era, including the Peloponnese city states in the 4th 
Century B.C.E. and the armies of Alexander the Great); see also ROSEN, supra 
note 6, at 45-46 (noting the earliest description of mercenaries as Libyan warriors 
in the employ of the Egyptian dynasties ruling from 1100 to 664 B.C.E.). 
Following 664 BCE, the Egyptians began hiring Greek mercenaries. Id. at 46. 
 18. See MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE STATE 158-61 
(1999) (explaining the pre-1648 practice of raising an army on the ruler’s behalf 
when needed in lieu of always maintaining a standing army in peace time). 
 19. See id. at 158 (describing the entrepreneur system in which a commander 
issued a commission to a recruiter to go out and hire soldiers). 
 20. See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED 
MILITARY INDUSTRY 30-31 (2003) [hereinafter SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS] 
(paralleling the development of the modern nation state with the creation of citizen 
armies instead of private forces); VAN CREVELD, supra note 18, at 160 (discussing 
the replacement of the entrepreneur system with permanently commissioned 
military officers and government run war ministries); see also Treaty of 
Westphalia; Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of 
France and Their Respective Allies, arts. LXXVII-LXXIX, Oct. 24, 1648, 
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm (detailing the terms 
of peace between all nations in Europe at the conclusion of the Thirty Years War, 
including disbanding all current armies and keeping only enough troops as 
considered absolutely necessary for national defense). 
 21. See JANICE E. THOMSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES, AND SOVEREIGNS: 
STATE-BUILDING AND EXTRATERRITORIAL VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 
31-32 (1994) (explaining that nationality was not the primary basis for determining 
service in armies from 1600-1800, but rather the skill of the soldier, irrespective of 
origin). The constant movement of professional soldiers across national boundaries 
was evident in the composition of state armies, often with twenty-five to sixty 
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B. INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLYING TO MERCENARIES 
The international community’s long history of customary use of 
mercenaries meant that there was no desire to challenge the 
traditional description of a mercenary22 until the latter half of the 
twentieth century.23 In a largely political movement against the West, 
Nigeria led the charge of African nations pushing for a new 
definition of “mercenary” under international law.24 However, the 
international community was split over the necessity for a definition 
of “mercenary”.25 In the end, a detailed definition of mercenary 
emerged as part of Article 47 of the 1977 Protocol I Additional of the 
Geneva Conventions.26 This international definition expanded with 
percent of an army composed of foreigners. Id. at 29. 
 22. Id. at 59 (arguing that mercenarism had flourished for hundreds of years, 
and that problems emerged not because of a backlash against using mercenaries, 
which many states were still happy to do, but rather because the mercenaries’ 
home states began to be held accountable in the international community for their 
citizens’ actions). 
 23. See DAVID SHEARER, PRIVATE ARMIES AND MILITARY INTERVENTION 
ADELPHI PAPER 316, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 15 
(1998) (describing the predations of mercenaries in Africa during the 1960s and 
1970s, and the view of African governments that these mercenaries represented the 
former colonial powers’ efforts to thwart self-determination). 
 24. See id. at 16 (discussing the Nigerian representatives’ insistence at the 
Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law in Geneva in the 1970s for a new 
definition of mercenary). 
 25. See F. J. Hampson, Mercenaries: Diagnosis before Prescription, 22 NETH. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 29 (1991) (commenting that the driving force behind the adoption 
of Article 47 came from Third World and socialist states acting in opposition to the 
West); Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize 
and Regulate Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (2003) 
(remarking that the discussions surrounding Protocol I were divided along Cold 
War lines, with the Soviet Union supporting the Third World states). 
 26. See Protocol Additional, supra note 7, art. 47. The article provides the 
following: 
Article 47. Mercenaries 
1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war. 
2. A mercenary is any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;  
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in the 
hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on 
behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that 
promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of 
that Party; (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict; (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party 
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the 1989 U.N. Convention on the Law of Mercenaries, which 
repeated the 1977 definition but also added language specifying that 
mercenaries were people undermining legitimate governments.27 
Consequently, the drafters created the Article 47 definition and the 
U.N. Convention in response to post-colonial conflict in Africa and 
had specific parties in mind when they drew up the extensive criteria 
for a “mercenary.”28
In addition to international agreements, customary international 
law (“CIL”) is also relevant to the discussion of mercenaries and 
PMCs.29  The U.N. Commission on Human Rights created the office 
of the Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries to continue to observe the 
global trends on mercenaries and decipher the customs among the 
states.30 Following the Special Rapporteur’s work, the U.N. created a 
to the conflict; and (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict 
on official duty as a member of its armed forces. 
Id. 
 27. See U.N. Convention, supra note 8. In addition to repeating the Article 47 
definition, the Convention adds the following language: 
2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation: 
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a 
concerted act of violence aimed at: (i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise 
undermining the constitutional order of a State; or (ii) Undermining the territorial 
integrity of a State; (b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for 
significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material 
compensation; (c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such 
an act is directed; (d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and (e) Is not a 
member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken. 
Id. (emphasis added) 
 28. See Milliard, supra note 25, at 5 (arguing that the drafters designed these 
narrow definitions to cover only those forces acting against the interests of post-
colonial African states). Milliard argues that as the mercenaries of the 1960s and 
1970s evolved into modern corporate entities, today’s PMCs, the mercenary 
definitions have remained inadequately focused on the old African mercenary. Id. 
at 5. 
 29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102(1) (2008) (listing international law as international 
agreements, customary law, and general principles recognized worldwide). 
Customary law is the “general and consistent practice of states followed by them 
from a sense of legal obligation.” Id. at 102(2); see also Charter of the United 
Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1033 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) (describing international law using the 
same terms as the Restatement, but also adding publications by qualified persons 
as an additional means for determining international rules). 
 30. See Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Special 
  
618 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:609 
 
special U.N. Working Group on Mercenaries with the mandate to 
continue to monitor mercenary activity and the use of PMCs.31
C. EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES 
As the Cold War wound down, PMCs and private security 
companies (“PSCs”) arrived on the world scene.32 Commentators 
place such companies on a scale ranging from actual armed combat 
support to advisor roles, security, and logistical support.33 PMCs are 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on use of mercenaries as a means 
of impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/specialrap.htm (last visited Apr. 
22, 2008) [hereinafter Use of Mercenaries]; see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council 
[ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Forty-Third Session, 7, 
E/CN.4/1987/60 Supp.5 (1987) (approving the creation of the position of Special 
Rapporteur by the Commission on Human Rights for an initial period of one year, 
renewable if necessary, and requiring the Rapporteur to submit ongoing reports to 
the Commission on Human Rights). 
 31. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Use of Mercenaries 
As a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of 
Peoples to Self-determination, Human Rights Resolution 2005/2, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/2 (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/45377c39c.html [hereinafter Use of Mercenaries Resolution]. 
 32. See HERBERT M. HOWE, AMBIGUOUS ORDER: MILITARY FORCES IN 
AFRICAN STATES 79-80 (2001) (commenting that the end of the Cold War flooded 
the world security market with both weapons and trained professionals); 
CHRISTOPHER KINSEY, CORPORATE SOLDIERS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: 
THE RISE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 50-51 (2006) (arguing that at the 
same time as mercenaries operated in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, private 
security companies were distancing themselves from such activities by focusing on 
providing security and protection to the commercial sector); SHEARER, supra note 
23, at 13 (comparing the change in the world order at the end of the Cold War and 
the consequent draw down of standing armies which created a pool of trained 
military professionals for hire with a similar environment at the end of the 
Hundred Years War); see also SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 
66-70 (describing a privatization revolution by many governments in the 1990s 
that encouraged more military and private security outsourcing). 
 33. See KINSEY, supra note 32, at 13-18 (distinguishing between corporations 
as PMCs, which engage in military support and may operate alongside military 
forces, Private Combat Companies, (“PCCs”), which engage solely in combat 
operations, and Private Security Companies, (“PSCs”), which focus on activities 
such as guarding buildings and people, maintaining public order, and acting as 
security advisers); SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 91-100 
(analogizing the privatized military industry to a spear, with logistical support 
contractors out of the line of fire, and at the tip of the spear, armed contractors 
accompanying military forces and potentially engaging in combat). 
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commercial entities with a clearly defined business structure and 
they openly compete on the global market to provide services to 
states, other multinational corporations, international institutions, and 
even non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”).34
D. COMPARATIVE DOMESTIC LAWS REGULATING PMCS 
In 1976, the British government conducted an investigation into 
the role of British fighters in Angola, and concluded that existing 
domestic laws on mercenaries were ineffective.35 Decades later, the 
British government further examined the role of PMCs during a 
series of hearings before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee.36 Although the Hearings Report proposed options for 
regulating PMCs, none of them have become law.37
South Africa is notable for being the only nation with a broad law 
regulating foreign military assistance.38 South Africa’s law on 
mercenaries covers far more activities than the international 
definitions, which focus solely on military conflict.39 The South 
 34. See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 44-47 (explaining 
that the industry is made up of legitimate businesses recognized by their home 
states that are open about their services, in contrast to mercenaries who wish to 
remain outside the law); see also DEBORAH D. AVANT, THE MARKET FOR FORCE: 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZING SECURITY 7 (2005) (observing that every 
U.N. peace operation since 1990 has involved some use of PSCs). 
 35. See KINSEY, supra note 32, at 136 & 141-42 (explaining the Diplock 
Committee’s recommendation that the U.K. should replace its Foreign Enlistments 
Act of 1870 with new legislation that would allow the government to intervene 
when specific hiring parties sought to recruit U.K. individuals for military service). 
 36. See FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, HC 577 PRIVATE MILITARY 
COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULATION 20 (2002)  [hereinafter U.K. GREEN 
PAPER] (noting that even after the 1976 Diplock Report the U.K. still has no laws 
effectively governing PMCs). 
 37. Cf. id. at 22-26 (proposing six options, including a complete ban on 
military activity abroad or a complete ban on recruiting for military activity 
abroad, creating a licensing regime focused on military actions or a simpler 
registration regime, a general license for PMCs for a range of activities, or a 
voluntary code of conduct among PMCs). 
 38. See KINSEY, supra note 32, at 138 (remarking that South African law 
expressly forbids mercenary activity, and outlaws even military assistance, such as 
training and advice, without government authorization). 
 39. See Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 § 1(iii)  
(S. Afr.) (listing foreign military assistance as services including advice and 
training, logistical support, medical services, and any other actions that might 
further some military interest). 
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African statute actually outlaws mercenary activity and uses a more 
traditional, simplified definition of a mercenary in lieu of the 
complicated Article 47 and Convention language.40 At the same time 
the South African law has a broad “foreign military assistance” 
definition, which covers a number of activities that PMCs typically 
engage in, and requires government approval to engage in such 
activities.41
E. U.S. DOMESTIC LAW REGULATING PMCS 
The United States already has laws in place for regulating military 
services provided to foreign entities.42 The United States recently 
revised the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), which 
previously applied only to members of the armed forces, to cover 
civilians accompanying military forces.43 Before this expansion of 
 40. See id. § 2 (“No person may within the Republic or elsewhere recruit, use, 
or train persons for or finance or engage in mercenary activity.”). The regulation 
describes mercenary activity as “direct participation as a combatant in armed 
conflict for private gain.” Id. §1(iv). 
 41. See id. §3 (forbidding any person within South Africa from providing 
foreign military assistance to any state or state agency or group of persons without 
first receiving approval from the government of South Africa). Gaining 
government approval involves filing an application with the National Conventional 
Arms Control Committee, which will in turn make a recommendation to the 
Minister of Defense. Id. § 4(1)-(2). 
 42. See Arms Export Control Act of 1968, 22 U.S.C. § 2752 (2007) (regulating 
the export of military services and arms brokering by U.S. companies); 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (2002) (requiring 
U.S. companies to obtain export licenses from the State Department Office of 
Defense Trade Controls before providing military products or services to foreign 
nationals); see also Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2007) (prohibiting 
the provision of assistance to any country which has a history of violating human 
rights). 
 43. Uniform Code of Military Justice “UCMJ” §2(a)(10) as amended by § 552 
of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 Pub. 
L. No. 109-364, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2006); see P.W. SINGER, CAN’T WIN WITH ‘EM, 
CAN’T GO TO WAR WITHOUT ‘EM: PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 12 (Brookings Inst. 2007), available at http://www. 
brookings.edu/papers/2007/0927militarycontractors.aspx [hereinafter SINGER, 
CAN’T WIN WITH ‘EM] (noting that at the time of the Blackwater shootings in 
Nisour square, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) had still not issued guidance to 
military lawyers on how to apply the revised UCMJ in the field); Memorandum 
from Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, UCMJ Jurisdiction Over DoD Civilian 
Employees, DoD Contractor Personnel, and Other Persons Serving With or 
Accompanying the Armed Forces Overseas During War and in Contingency 
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the UCMJ’s jurisdiction, contractors working for the U.S. military 
were only accountable to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
(“MEJA”).44 Since the MEJA and the extended UCMJ still only 
apply to personnel working for the Department of Defense (“DoD”), 
these laws fail to capture security contractors working for other 
government agencies, like Blackwater and Unity Resources, who 
provide armed security for the U.S. State Department.45 While the 
United States may have the ability to prosecute American citizens 
working for PMCs under the UCMJ and MEJA, U.S. jurisdiction 
may not always extend to foreign nationals working in Iraq.46 
Operations (Mar. 10, 2008) (ordering all the military departments of the U.S. DoD 
to revise their guidance and regulations in accordance with the expanded UCMJ). 
The Memorandum implicitly authorizes U.S. Commanders to seize PMC operators 
by reminding Commanders they have the broad authority to apprehend anyone 
interfering with operations even when the identity of such persons is not 
immediately apparent. Id. 
 44. See Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”), Pub. L. No. 106-
523, 114 Stat. 2488, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2000) (extending U.S. Federal 
jurisdiction over anyone employed by U.S. armed forces, including Department of 
Defense “DoD” contractors and their subcontractors); see also Jennifer K. Elsea et 
al., Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other 
Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 25 (Aug. 25, 2008) (noting that only twelve 
persons have been charged under MEJA since its passage in 2000). But see United 
States of America v. Paul Alvin Slough, Nicholas Abeam Slatten, Evan Shawn 
Liberty, Dustin Laurent Heard, Donald Wayne Ball, No. CR-08-360 (D.C. Cir. 
filed Dec. 4, 2008) (arguing that the Blackwater employees involved in the Nisour 
Square incident fall under the MEJA because their employment was “related to 
supporting the mission” of the Department of Defense, even though their contract 
was with the State Department, and charging them with voluntary manslaughter 
and other crimes under U.S. law). 
 45. See RICHARD D. WALLWORK, OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRIVATE 
MILITARY COMPANIES IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 50 (2005), available at 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA436294 (arguing that PMCs avoid accountability 
under the MEJA by being hired by government agencies other than the DoD). For 
example, the Caci International Inc. contractors that became embroiled in the 
interrogation scandal at Abu Ghraib prison were on a contract for the Department 
of the Interior and thus did not fall under the DoD and the MEJA. Id. at 52. See 
SINGER, CAN’T WIN WITH ‘EM, supra note 43, at 7 (noting that while the U.S. 
soldiers involved in the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison were brought before a court-
martial, the United States has not prosecuted any of the private contractors that 
were involved). 
 46. See Elsea et al., supra note 44, at 24 (commenting that U.S. citizens can be 
prosecuted back in U.S. courts, but noting that Iraqi subcontractors would be 
exempt from the MEJA because the law does not cover nationals of the host 
nation).  
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Furthermore, until the passage of a Status of Forces Agreement 
(“SOFA”),47 foreign nationals working for contractors were immune 
under Iraqi Law because of Coalitional Provisional Authority 
(“CPA”) Order 17, which meant that a foreign national working for a 
PMC was unaccountable under both U.S. and Iraqi law.48 The United 
States also cannot exercise jurisdiction over a completely foreign 
firm, such as Unity, and is limited to severing its contractual 
arrangement.49
II. ANALYSIS 
Since PMCs are often called “mercenaries,” the threshold issue is 
whether they are accountable under the existing international law on 
mercenaries.50 However, the international agreements that do address 
mercenaries are unwieldy instruments that PMCs can avoid by 
 47. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Iraq On the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their 
Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, U.S.-Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, art. 
12 Jurisdiction ¶ 6, available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/CGs_Messages/ 
security_agreement.pdf (agreeing that the government of Iraq shall have the 
“primary right” to exercise jurisdiction over contractors supporting United States 
forces). However, the agreement does not define “primary right” and the clause is 
further limited to only contractors supporting the Department of Defense and still 
does not cover contractors supporting other U.S. agencies. See id. art. 2 Definitions 
(describing U.S. contractors as only those that support U.S. forces, and further 
defining “United States Forces” as only the Armed forces and their civilian 
components). 
 48. See Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”), Status Of The Coalition 
Provisional Authority, MNF-Iraq, Certain Missions And Personnel In Iraq, CPA 
Order No. 17, at sec. 4(3) (June 27, 2004), available at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_A
nnex_A.pdf; cf. Elsea et al., supra note 44, at 19 (noting that as of August 2008, 
the CPA Order 17 remained in effect and exempted all contractors from Iraqi laws 
while in the performance of their contracts). 
 49. See Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and 
Status Report: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 
110th Cong. 142 (2007) (statement of Alan Chvotkin, head of PMC trade 
organization) (noting that there are many PMCs in Iraq working for non-U.S. 
government parties, such as coalition allies and NGOS). 
 50. See P.W. Singer, Essay, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized 
Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 524 
(2004) [hereinafter Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law] (noting that 
PMCs are companies that sell military service, and under international law, an 
individual who does the same thing is a mercenary). 
  
2009] SEPARATING PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 623 
 
escaping any single clause.51 State practice tends to accept PMCs 
under customary international law in the wake of ineffective 
international agreements.52 Customary international law does place 
some limits on the proper roles of PMCs in the state-based 
international system.53
A.WHAT’S IN A NAME: PMCS CAN AVOID THE INTERNATIONAL 
DEFINITIONS OF “MERCENARY” UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS BECAUSE THE DEFINITIONS ARE CUMULATIVE 
PMCs are likely to argue that they are not “mercenaries” if they do 
not meet the specific criteria in the Article 47 and the U.N. 
Convention definitions.54 If PMCs can avoid even one section of the 
international definitions of Article 47 and the U.N. Convention, then 
they can escape the coverage of the entire definition.55 Therefore it is 
necessary to examine both Article 47 and the U.N. Convention
 51. See infra Part II.A (illustrating that while some clauses can readily apply to 
PMCs, others are easier to escape, and thus the whole definition may not apply to 
PMCs). 
 52. See infra Part II.B (describing the trend of state use of PMCs by states that 
also condemn mercenaries). 
 53. See id. (emphasizing that PMCs are legitimate entities only when the hiring 
party is a legitimate actor in the international community; otherwise, the PMC is 
engaged in criminal activity by undermining traditional state sovereignty over the 
use of violent force). 
 54. See SHEARER, supra note 23, at 17-20 (commenting that PMCs argue they 
will only work for recognized governments, which does not make them 
mercenaries under the international definitions); see also Hearing on Blackwater 
USA: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th 
Cong. 134-35 (2007) [hereinafter Blackwater USA Hearing] (quoting Blackwater 
CEO Erik Prince as claiming that his American employees are not mercenaries 
according to the Oxford Dictionary definition of “mercenary,” while admitting that 
Blackwater employs foreign nationals). 
 55. See U.K. GREEN PAPER, supra note 36, at 6 (explaining that a person is a 
mercenary only when all provisions in the definitions are met); ECOSOC, 
Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the question of the use of mercenaries as a 
means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples 
to self-determination, ¶ 86, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/24 (Feb. 20, 1997) (prepared 
by Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Special Rapporteur) [hereinafter U.N. Special 
Rapporteur 1997 Report] (clarifying that Article 47 requirements are cumulative 
and it is difficult to prove that all the concurrent elements are met); SHEARER, 
supra note 23, at 18-19 (emphasizing that PMCs can avoid the cumulative criteria 
of these definitions by carefully wording their contracts with a client). 
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definitions in their entirety to determine whether all the clauses, or 
only some of them, capture PMCs. 
1. PMCs Could Fall Under Some Provisions of the Article 47 
Definition, but PMCs May Easily Avoid Other Provisions and 
Thereby Avoid the Entire Definition 
PMCs could fall under sections (a) and (b) if a broad interpretation 
of direct participation in conflict is used.56 PMCs are less likely to 
fall under section (c) because of difficulties in determining 
motivation.57 PMCs could fall under other sections relatively easily, 
such as section (d), requiring mercenaries be foreigners.58 However, 
unless a PMC fits within all the clauses, it will escape the coverage 
of the definition. 
a. Section (a) Only Applies to Fighting in Armed Conflicts, and Does Not 
Cover Support or Advisor Roles 
A PMC could fall under section (a) if hired specifically for an 
armed conflict.59 PMCs that were hired specifically for operations in 
Iraq could fall under this section because the term “armed conflict” 
encompasses a range of possibilities from outright war to low 
intensity conflict.60 However, someone would have to hire a person 
to actually “fight” in the armed conflict for that person to fall under 
section (a).61 Thus, if a party has hired a PMC for non-combat roles, 
 56. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
(Yves Sandoz et al., eds., Tony Langham et al., trans., 1987) ¶ 1806, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=470&t=com [hereinafter 
Protocol I Commentary] (noting that hired advisers and support personnel may 
meet all the other clauses in the mercenary definition, but avoid being labeled 
mercenaries so long as they stay out of combat). 
 57. See id. ¶ 1802 (emphasizing that despite the definitions in many provisions, 
the greatest factor in determining a mercenary is really their desire for monetary 
gain). 
 58. See id. (clarifying that mercenaries are only a subsection of the many 
foreign volunteers that augment modern military forces). 
 59. Protocol Additional, supra note 7, art. 47(2)(a). 
 60. See Protocol I Commentary, supra note 56, ¶¶ 62-65 (emphasizing that the 
provisions of the Convention will apply to any conflict involving recognized 
armed forces, regardless of scope and intensity). 
 61. See Protocol Additional, supra note 7, art. 43 (explaining that the right to 
direct involvement in combat is limited to legitimate combatants). However, the 
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even for a specific conflict, the PMC can escape this section because 
the personnel are non-fighters.62 If a party hires a PMC to provide 
security for people or installations, then the PMC was not hired 
specifically to fight, although the PMC may be drawn into the 
conflict by virtue of being on the scene.63 Furthermore, a party may 
hire a PMC to provide security in a dangerous place, but not one that 
is currently involved in any “armed conflict.”64 Even if such PMCs 
become involved in fighting when armed conflict erupts, they would 
not fall under section (a) because they were not hired for a fighting 
role.65
definition of combatant is broad, and could certainly include PMCs if they take 
commands from a state party. See id. art. 43(1) (noting that armed forces include 
not only the military but any groups and units that are under the command of a 
Party to the Convention); id. art. 43(3) (allowing the incorporation of paramilitary 
and law enforcement units under the definition of armed forces); see also J. Ricou 
Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the 
Armed Forces, 57 A.F. L. REV. 155, 170-73 (2005) (explaining that even though 
the definition of combatant is broad, combatants are still readily identified by the 
requirement of carrying arms openly before any attack). 
 62. See Protocol Additional, supra note 7, art. 47(2)(a)-(b) (requiring that a 
mercenary be someone hired specifically for an armed conflict who actually 
participates in the conflict); SHEARER, supra note 23, at 18 (noting that the firms 
Military Professional Resources Incorporated and Executive Outcomes have 
always claimed that their personnel are advisers and trainers and therefore exclude 
themselves from the definition of mercenary). But see U.K. GREEN PAPER, supra 
note 36, at 11 (using the example of Executive Outcomes’ involvement in the 
Angolan conflict to caution that even non-combat support by PMCs can have a 
huge impact on war fighting ability). 
 63. Cf. Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military Contractors and 
Status Report: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government 
Reform, 110th Cong. 121 (2007) (statement by Andrew Howell, General Counsel 
for Blackwater USA) (declaring that Blackwater is involved in protective security 
operations only and is not involved in combat operations). 
 64. Cf. KINSEY, supra note 32, at 17 (discussing security companies operating 
in dangerous areas of Angola and Colombia on behalf of the international oil, gas, 
and diamond industries). 
 65. Cf. CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, 
SECRECY, AND THE END OF THE REPUBLIC 135 (2004) (describing Vinnell Corp. as 
retained since 1975 by Saudi Arabia for ongoing duties such as training the Saudi 
National Guard, running military academies, and writing Saudi military doctrine, 
and noting that at times Vinnell has engaged in combat support roles alongside 
Saudi Arabian forces). 
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b. Section (b) Requires a Direct Role in Actual Fighting, Which May 
Include PMCs Under a Broad Interpretation of “Direct” 
Related to section (a), section (b) requires that a mercenary 
actually take direct part in the conflict.66 Therefore, even if a party 
hires a PMC to fight in an armed conflict as required by section (a), 
the PMC could still escape section (b) if the PMC does not engage in 
any direct fighting.67 However, the meaning of taking a “direct” part 
in fighting is to be interpreted quite broadly under the realities of 
modern conflict.68 Because taking direct part in combat requires only 
a link between some action and harm to the enemy,69 the reach of 
modern weapons means that a person physically far from a 
battlefield may be responsible for harm simply by pressing a 
button.70 Thus, a broad interpretation of the meaning of “direct” 
could include a person who selects targets for attacks or fires a 
weapon remotely, because there is a causal link between that activity 
and harm to the enemy.71 Therefore under a broad meaning of direct 
participation, a PMC would likely fall under section (b), but this is 
not so under a narrow definition. 
 66. See Protocol Additional, supra note 7, art. 47(2)(b). 
 67. See JAMES R. DAVIS, FORTUNE’S WARRIORS: PRIVATE ARMIES AND THE 
NEW WORLD ORDER 195 (2000) (noting that the mercenary profession throughout 
history more often involved a hiring party using the intimidating presence of 
mercenaries as a deterrent rather than actually using them for fighting). 
 68. See U.K. GREEN PAPER, supra note 36, at 8 (noting that any distinction 
between combat and non-combat roles is unrealistic because support personnel are 
as much a vital part of a modern military operation as actual fighters). 
 69. See Protocol I Commentary, supra note 56, ¶ 1679 (stating that “[d]irect 
participation in hostilities implies a direct causal relationship between the activity 
engaged in and the harm done to the enemy at the time and the place where the 
activity takes place”). 
 70. See Heaton, supra note 61, at 179 (remarking that physical distance is 
irrelevant when determining direct participation, so long as the connection between 
an action and harm to the enemy are present). 
 71. See id. at 178 (observing that with modern technology, activities from a 
distance such as gathering intelligence and firing missiles can actually inflict just 
as much harm as activities closer to the enemy). 
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c. Section (c) Requires Financial Motivation, Which is Difficult to Measure 
with PMCs 
The most likely section that applies to PMCs is section (c), which 
requires that material gain motivate a mercenary, and that the 
material compensation is greater than that of a Party’s armed 
forces.72 One could consider PMCs mercenaries under section (c) 
because PMCs are primarily businesses interested in making 
money.73 Also, PMC contracts with their personnel may indicate that 
PMCs pay more than states pay the members of their armed forces.74 
However, the requirement that private gain be the essential motivator 
of a mercenary is problematic because one could likely argue that 
private gain is only one of many factors motivating them.75 
Furthermore, the section requires that mercenary compensation be 
“significantly in excess” of that paid to members of the armed forces 
of “similar rank and function.”76 PMCs advertise their services as 
highly specialized and professional, and thus comparison costs 
should be between Special Forces operators and PMC employees.77 
 72. See Protocol Additional, supra note 7, art. 47(2)(c). 
 73. See SHEARER, supra note 23, at 74 (arguing that PMCs are driven by the 
desire of their shareholders to make profits). 
 74. See U.N. Special Rapporteur 1997 Report, supra note 55, ¶ 41 (noting that 
South African PMCs could offer more than five times what military personnel 
were being paid); see also Blackwater USA Hearing, supra note 54, at 107 
(statement by Rep. Duncan) (remarking that Blackwater pays its employees an 
excessive amount compared to U.S. military personnel). 
 75. See Protocol I Commentary, supra note 56, ¶ 1809 (explaining that a 
person could be a mercenary under all other sections of the definition but be 
motivated by ideology rather than material gain); see also U.K. GREEN PAPER, 
supra note 36, at 7 (pointing out that it is hard to distinguish mercenaries from 
volunteers, such as Islamic militants in Afghanistan, who might be motivated just 
as much by payment as by their beliefs). 
 76. See Protocol Additional, supra note 7, art. 47(2)(c); see also Protocol I 
Commentary, supra note 56, ¶ 1807 (emphasizing that because all members of the 
armed forces receive pay for their services, only pay above and beyond that rate 
distinguishes a mercenary from a member of the armed forces). 
 77. See WALLWORK, supra note 45, at 29 (arguing that PMCs focus on 
recruiting from ex-Special Forces personnel so that some hiring countries are able 
to further utilize the training they have already invested in these people); see also 
Protocol I Commentary, supra note 56, ¶ 1810 (concluding that a person doing the 
same work and receiving the same pay as a military member is simply not a 
mercenary, even if the person is involved in combat alongside military forces). 
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However, it is hard to determine if PMC employees really receive 
wages in excess of the armed forces, because it is unclear whether 
outsourcing functions to PMCs saves money or costs more than the 
military doing the work itself.78 Furthermore, because it would be 
difficult to confirm that compensation is the primary motivator, this 
section would likely not cover PMCs.79
d. Sections (d), (e), and (f) Involving Foreign Nationals that Are Not 
Members of Any Armed Forces Could be Avoided by PMC Contract 
Language 
Section (d) defines mercenaries as foreign nationals.80 It is very 
likely that a PMC will have employees in a conflict zone that fall 
under section (d) because PMCs recruit people from all over the 
world.81 Furthermore, PMCs could very likely fall under section (e), 
which stipulates mercenaries act outside the armed forces.82 Yet if 
PMCs were taking orders directly from the armed forces, perhaps 
because a contract required it, then they would effectively be 
considered members of the armed forces and not mercenaries.83 Such 
 78. Compare DAVIS, supra note 67, at 128 (remarking that while the U.N. 
observer force in Angola cost $1 million a day, the contract between Angola and 
the PMC Executive Outcomes was a mere $40 million a year), and WALLWORK, 
supra note 45, at 32 (describing the economic argument that PMCs save the 
military money because of the efficiency of the private sector), with Elsea et al., 
supra note 44, at 49 (noting that the cost advantage to the government of using 
PMCs may vary or disappear altogether, as it did with Blackwater, because of 
contract markups), and SINGER, CAN’T WIN WITH ‘EM, supra note 43, at 4 
(observing that an audit has estimated $10 billion in unsupported costs from PMCs 
in Iraq). 
 79. See SHEARER, supra note 23, at 18 (stressing that the psychological element 
of motivation would be difficult to prove). 
 80. See Protocol Additional, supra note 7, art. 47(2)(d) (stating that a 
mercenary is not a citizen of any state involved in the conflict or from any territory 
belonging to a state involved in the conflict). 
 81. See SINGER, CAN’T WIN WITH ‘EM, supra note 43, at 2 (remarking that 
there are about 180,000 private contractors in Iraq and they come from at least 
thirty different countries); Ashley Deeks, Getting a Grip on Private Security 
Contractors, DEFENSE NEWS, Jan. 7, 2008, at 21 (noting that PMC employees 
often come from countries with no connection to the state where the employee 
works). 
 82. See Protocol Additional, supra note 7, art. 47(2)(e) (providing that a 
mercenary is “not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict”). 
 83. See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 50, at 532-33 
(describing how the PMC Sandline worded its contract with Papua New Guinea so 
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a contract would also allow a PMC to escape the last clause of the 
Article 47 definition, section (f), which accepts the presence of 
armed forces from third parties.84 While a PMC could fall under 
some sections more readily than others, the cumulative requirement 
of Article 47 means that it would be very difficult to find an armed 
conflict where a PMC is truly acting as a mercenary under all 
sections of Article 47. It is therefore necessary to look at the 
definition under the U.N. Convention for additional language that 
may capture PMCs where Article 47 does not. 
2. The U.N. Convention Has Broader Language than Article 47, but 
is Nonetheless Limited by the Caveat that Mercenaries Must 
Undermine a State Government 
The U.N. Convention uses the same language as Article 47 for its 
initial definition of a mercenary,85 but also adds a second 
definition.86 The second definition covers mercenaries outside of 
armed conflict by creating a wider net that covers any violent 
scenario.87 This broader terminology indicates that a mercenary is 
not limited to an international conflict, but may appear in a civil or 
internal conflict.88 The definition also lowers the threshold for 
material compensation because it does not compare the mercenary’s 
payment to the wages of armed forces, but instead merely requires 
that some vague promise of payment entice the mercenary to act.89 
that its personnel were “special constables” for the government, so as to avoid the 
international laws on mercenaries); Protocol I Commentary, supra note 56, ¶ 1813 
(remarking that even temporary enlistment in a state’s armed forces just for the 
duration of the conflict will allow a person to escape the mercenary definition). 
 84. See Protocol Additional, supra note 7, art. 47(2)(f) (requiring that a 
mercenary is not someone “sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on 
official duty as a member of its armed forces”). 
 85. See U.N. Special Rapporteur 1997 Report, supra note 55, ¶ 87 (noting that 
the U.N. Convention made no progress to a more effective definition of mercenary 
because it repeats the Article 47 definition). 
 86. See U.N. Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(2)(a). 
 87. See id. art. 1(2)(a) (declaring that a mercenary is a person involved in an act 
of violence targeted at a government). 
 88. See Protocol I Commentary, supra note 56, ¶ 1800 (emphasizing that 
Article 47, as part of the Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, covers only 
international armed conflict). 
 89. See U.N. Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(2)(b) (requiring that the 
mercenary be  motivated by “the desire for significant private gain and is prompted 
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However, the definition also exempts situations where a state sends a 
person on official duty in contrast to Article 47, which only exempts 
members of the armed forces.90 Lastly, the U.N. Convention’s 
second definition only applies to situations that undermine the 
sovereignty of a state.91
The U.N. convention’s broader coverage of acts of violence, 
instead of just armed conflicts, would cover PMCs because PMCs 
often provide security and support in countries not currently engaged 
in international armed conflict.92 Furthermore, a PMC responding to 
a threat with violent force would be engaging in an act of violence 
even though there is no international armed conflict.93 However, 
because the U.N. Convention definition contains the provision that 
the violence must involve overthrowing a government, a PMC is 
likely to escape this section.94
The broader requirement of the second definition, that material 
compensation “prompt” the mercenary into participation in the 
conflict, may cover PMCs because, unlike Article 47, there is no 
requirement to show that such material compensation is somehow 
excessive.95 However, a PMC could escape this section, because it 
would be hard to determine if the motivating factor was private gain 
and not some combination of factors.96 A PMC could find it easier to 
escape the language on compensation in the U.N. Convention than 
the similar clause in Article 47, because the U.N. Convention 
by the promise or payment of material compensation”). 
 90. Compare id. art.1(2)(d), (exempting those who “ha[ve] not been sent by a 
State on official duty”), with Protocol Additional, supra note 8, art. 47(2)(e) 
(exempting when “not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict”). 
 91. See U.N. Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(2)(a)(i) (defining as 
overthrowing a government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a 
State; or (ii) undermining the territorial integrity of a State”). 
 92. See U.K. GREEN PAPER, supra note 36, at 16 (noting that PMCs are often 
active in dangerous areas on behalf of mineral extraction industries). 
 93. See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 89 (explaining that 
PMCs that protect installations can quickly move from a passive role to actively 
fending off attacks with combat action). 
 94. See U.N. Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(2)(a)(i)-(ii) (requiring that such 
violent acts be specifically targeted at the internal stability of a State). 
 95. See id. art. 1(2)(b). 
 96. See U.K. GREEN PAPER, supra note 36, at 7 (noting that some sort of 
payment may still motivate ostensibly idealistic volunteers and thus it is hard to 
decipher the primary form of motivation). 
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language allows for official duty on behalf of a state, not just as a 
member of the armed forces.97 Therefore, a state agency may 
contract a PMC to perform an official duty for the state, rather than 
with the armed forces, to avoid the U.N. Convention.98 Overall, the 
second definition in the U.N. Convention has broader language that 
could apply to PMCs where Article 47 does not, but in the end, the 
requirement that mercenary actions must involve undermining a 
government limits the entire definition.99
Both Article 47 and the U.N. Convention have sections that could 
certainly apply to PMCs, but because PMCs could likely escape 
other sections, or parts of the definition, the overall utility of the 
definitions is limited. Because the definitions are cumulative, those 
few sections that PMCs are most likely to avoid become fatal to the 
entire definition. Recognizing the limitations of Article 47 and the 
U.N. Convention to adequately capture PMCs, the analysis must turn 
to other sources of international law. 
B. PMCS ARE LEGITIMATE SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS UNDER 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN ACTING ON BEHALF OF 
A LEGITIMATE STATE AND REPRESENTING THAT STATE’S 
AUTHORITY 
If PMCs can avoid the definitions of Article 47 and the U.N. 
Convention, then it would appear that they are not mercenaries under 
international law, which would leave their international status in a 
conflict unclear.100 However, that is only part of the analysis. In 
addition to treaties, international law also consists of the customs and 
practices arising between states.101 If customary international law 
 97. See U.N. Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(2)(d). 
 98. Cf. KINSEY, supra note 32, at 110 (commenting that many government 
agencies worldwide, not just state militaries, now outsource their work to private 
firms). 
 99. See U.N. Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(2)(a)(i)-(ii). 
 100. See SHEARER, supra note 23, at 20 (discussing the U.S. laws on mercenary 
activity and concluding that the United States does not believe mercenaries should 
be denied the protections other combatants receive under international law). 
Shearer notes that Article 47(1) states that a mercenary shall not have the same 
rights of a prisoner of war, which is a complete reversal of the traditional laws of 
war. Id. at 19. 
 101. See JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 36 (2004) (describing the widely held view that 
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covers PMCs, then PMCs cannot escape international accountability 
merely because they do not meet the definitions of mercenaries in 
Article 47 and the U.N. Convention.102
1. The Customary Law Has Greater Weight Because  
Article 47 and The U.N. Convention on Mercenaries  
are not Accepted International Law 
A nation that is a Party to the Geneva Conventions, but has not 
ratified the Additional Protocol, is not bound by the definition of 
mercenary in Article 47.103 While the international community has 
agreed to the original Geneva Conventions, not all nations have 
agreed to these Additional Protocols, despite their publication over 
thirty years ago.104  For example, the United States protested the 
Article 47 provisions on mercenaries, refusing to recognize the 
definition, or accept the Additional Protocols.105 Therefore Article 47 
is not a strong reflection of customary international law, because 
even after thirty years, not all of the parties to the Geneva 
Convention have approved the Additional Protocol that contains 
Article 47. 
principles of customary international law (“CIL”) may be found by comparing 
legal systems worldwide and looking for fundamental trends). 
 102. See id. at 25 (noting that treaties and CIL have equal weight, and any gaps 
in international agreements may be filled by recourse to CIL). 
 103. See Protocol Additional, supra note 7, art. 95 (explaining that a state is only 
bound to the new Protocol six months after the state submits instruments of 
ratification). 
 104. See International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), International 
Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents: 1949 Conventions & Additional 
Protocols, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView (last visited Apr. 
22, 2008) (listing 194 state parties to the four Geneva Conventions but only 168 
parties to the Additional Protocol I). Furthermore, five states have signed, but not 
ratified the Protocol, including the United States. Id. 
 105. See Ronald Reagan, Message to the Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions (Jan. 29, 1987), available at http://www.reagan. 
utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/012987B.HTM (last visited Apr. 22, 2008) 
(requesting the Senate give advice and consent to the ratification of Protocol II but 
refuse to ratify Protocol I because it is fundamentally flawed); ROSEN, supra note 
6, at 189 (noting that after the United States refused to sign the 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions, many other nations followed suit); 
Milliard, supra note 25, at 37 (reporting statements by the U.S. State Department 
legal office that the United States did not favor the provisions of Article 47 and 
furthermore did not consider them to be part of customary international law). 
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The search for customary international law now turns to 
international support for the U.N. Convention. Only those countries 
that sign the U.N. Convention are bound by it, so that definition only 
directly applies to activities in the signatory countries.106 However, 
the U.N. Convention has garnered even less support than Article 47: 
it has taken decades to come into effect, and far fewer states have 
signed the Convention than ratified Article 47.107
The lack of world wide support for Article 47 and the U.N. 
Convention demonstrates that they do not reflect the customary 
international law of nations.108 Therefore, it is misleading to claim 
PMCs are not “mercenaries” simply because they do not fall under 
the Article 47 and U.N. Convention definitions, when those 
definitions are not even accepted by all nations as international 
law.109 Such an argument simultaneously claims that these 
 106. See U.N. Convention, supra note 8, arts. 18-19 (specifying that states 
become parties to the Convention by ratification, and the Convention will only 
come into effect after twenty-two states have ratified it). 
 107. See ECOSOC, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the question of 
the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the 
exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/15 (Dec. 24, 2003) (prepared by Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, 
Special Rapporteur) [hereinafter U.N. Special Rapporteur 2004 Report] (listing the 
twenty five countries that are signatories to the Convention on Mercenaries). 
 108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102(3) (1987) (“International agreements create law for the state 
parties thereto and may lead to the creation of customary international law when 
such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact 
widely accepted”); see also Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra 
note 50, at 531 (arguing that the Convention acts as anti-customary international 
law because the major state powers are not signatories, many of the signatories 
have benefited from the use of mercenaries, and no one has been prosecuted under 
the Convention). 
 109. See SHEARER, supra note 23, at 76 (observing that the Convention only has 
the support of a few states, and that under most domestic laws mercenary activity 
is only restricted but not outright criminalized); Milliard, supra note 33, at 66 
(commenting that with only a handful of states actually signed on as Parties to the 
Convention, “[a]s an indication of states’ practices, this is not a ringing 
endorsement for the U.N. Mercenary Convention or its legal predecessors”); see 
also Juan Carlos Zarate,  The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private 
International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World 
Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75, 140-41 (1998) (highlighting that the same 
African countries that originally proposed the international laws on mercenaries 
now have no qualms about employing private security companies such as 
Executive Outcomes). 
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definitions are the only international law on mercenaries and 
consequently, since PMCs do not meet those specific definitions, 
then there is no international law that applies to PMCs.110 But this 
argument ignores centuries of precedent, where a mercenary was 
simply someone who received payment for military service and was 
a legitimate actor.111 Under the simpler, traditional definition of 
“mercenary” that predates Article 47 and the U.N. Convention, many 
of these firms are acting as mercenaries.112
2. PMCs Continuing Corporate Existence and Use 
by Only Legitimate States Distinguishes Them 
 from the Illegitimate Mercenary 
Because Article 47 and the U.N. Convention do not represent 
consensus among the international community, it is necessary to 
determine whether other customary international law on mercenaries 
better reflects the current attitudes among states.113 The U.N. Human 
Rights Commissioner set up an office to investigate global trends 
involving mercenaries and the increasing use of PMCs.114 These 
investigations can reveal whether there is some consistent practice 
 110. See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 50, at 533-34 
(arguing that since the international definitions focus only on individuals, there is 
no international mechanism for regulating firms or those who hire them). 
 111. See DAVIS, supra note 67, at 42 (reiterating that up until the latter half of 
the twentieth century, professional military support for hire was accepted in both 
domestic and international policy). 
 112. See Milliard, supra note 25, at 8 (commenting that the corporate model that 
PMCs use is really not that different from the Varangian Guard that protected the 
Byzantine Emperor for hundreds of years, the “free companies” of mercenaries in 
the Middle Ages, or the English Company of the Staple and Merchant 
Adventurers); Zarate, supra note 109, at 77, 91 (noting that many commentators 
consider PMCs just a more sophisticated group of mercenaries and remarking that 
PMCs are modern versions of mercenary business organizations, like the Italian 
condottieri and free companies). 
 113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102(1) cmt. j (1987) (noting that while international agreements 
and CIL generally have equal weight, new rules of CIL can overtake prior 
international agreements); Manley O. Hudson, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 24, 26 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.a/1950/Add.1. (June 6, 1957) (describing customary 
international law as some continual practice in international relations by a number 
of states over time, with acquiescence in the practice by other states, and a general 
sense that the practice is consistent with other international laws). 
 114. Cf. Use of Mercenaries, supra note 30. 
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among states.115 Furthermore, the behavior of states towards 
mercenaries and PMCs, and trends in domestic laws, can reveal 
customs in the international community.116
a. Investigations of the U.N. Special Rapporteur and the Working Group on 
Mercenaries Demonstrate that International Custom Accepts the Use 
of PMCs but Condemns Individual Mercenary Operators 
The U.N. appointed the Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries to 
correct the deficiencies in Article 47 and the U.N. Convention by 
recourse to customary international law.117 The mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur included ferreting out the true customary 
international law because of the lack of encapsulation of customary 
international law by Article 47 and the U.N. Convention.118 The 
creation of a special working group indicates the view of the 
international community that Article 47 and the U.N. Convention do 
not reflect the real activities of mercenaries and PMCs.119 
Furthermore, the call for new standards and a new definition of 
mercenaries both by the Rapporteur and the Working Group 
 115. See id. (describing the authority of the Special Rapporteur to explore the 
subject of mercenaries, including visiting areas of mercenary activity, and paying 
particular attention to the forms PMCs may take and any connections to mercenary 
activity). 
 116. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 102(1) cmt. l (1987) (commenting that where there is no 
international agreement on point, general principles present in national systems are 
an appropriate source of international law, and may indicate customary 
international law through practice among states). 
 117. See U.N. Special Rapporteur 2004 Report, supra note 107, paras. 52-53 
(explaining that while other mandates arise under international legal instruments, it 
is precisely because the international treaty law on mercenaries is unworkable that 
the Special Rapporteur is mandated to investigate the customary international law). 
 118. See ECOSOC, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Report Of The Second 
Meeting Of Experts On Traditional And New Forms Of Mercenary Activities As A 
Means Of Violating Human Rights And Impeding The Exercise Of The Right Of 
Peoples To Self-Determination, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/4 (June 
 24, 2002) (commenting that there is still no appropriate international legal 
definition of mercenary and that the definitions in Article 47 and the U.N. 
Convention are unworkable); see also U.N. Special Rapporteur 1997 Report, supra 
note 55, ¶¶ 77-79 (declaring there is a need to redefine customary international law 
on mercenaries and perhaps even revise existing treaty law). 
 119. See Use of Mercenaries Resolution, supra note 31, ¶ 17 (noting that 
mercenaries are continually taking on new forms of organization so the Working 
Group should pay close attention to the actions of PMCs). 
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demonstrates that the international community does not support the 
ability of PMCs to escape accountability merely because they can 
avoid the definitions in Article 47 and the U.N. Convention.120 
However, the Special Rapporteur and the Working Group revealed a 
distinction between legitimate PMCs and mercenaries by strongly 
emphasizing the criminal factor in mercenary activity.121 In contrast, 
PMCs are legitimate largely because they provide military and 
security assistance openly to recognized state parties.122 The PMC 
gains its legitimacy from the hiring party as long as the hiring party 
is sending the PMC on a legitimate mission.123 Thus, investigations 
by the U.N. Special Rapporteur and the Working Group emphasize 
the difference between the legitimate use of PMCs124 and the 
illegitimate lone operator that Article 47 and the U.N. Convention 
intended to categorize as a “mercenary.”125
 120. See Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, U.N. Working 
Group on Mercenaries; Methods of Work, ¶ 12, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ 
issues/mercenaries/work.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2008) (demonstrating the 
similarities between individual mercenaries and PMCs by including in the 
Working Group’s mandate all mercenary and PMC activity); see also Milliard, 
supra note 25, at 56 (illustrating that PMCs are related to mercenary issues, but 
international agreements still do not address them). 
 121. See U.N. Special Rapporteur 1997 Report, supra note 55, ¶ 74 
(commenting that it is only when a state hires persons to engage in operations that 
go against international law that the state has hired mercenaries and created a 
criminal alliance between the mercenary and the recruiting Party). 
 122. See id. ¶¶ 96, 107 (remarking that as of 1997, thirty-four countries were 
interested in hiring the PMC Executive Outcomes and noting that clearly defined 
military assistance missions by private companies are acceptable under 
international law); see also Getting Boots Off the Ground, THE ECONOMIST, 
Jan. 26-Feb. 1, 2008, at 59 (discussing the difficulty of getting member states to 
provide helicopters for U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa, and that the U.N. 
is currently hiring private firms to provide helicopter transport). 
 123. See THOMSON, supra note 21, at 147 (explaining that the international 
system reinforces the state monopoly over violence by creating expectations in 
interstate relations that a true state will assert control over violence emanating from 
its territory); WALLWORK, supra note 45, at 46-47 (underscoring that in the state-
based international system, states retain the legal authority for PMCs to take any 
action, as demonstrated by the fact that no PMC has ever operated against its home 
state). 
 124. See ROSEN, supra note 6, at 17 (remarking that “legitimate” mercenaries 
voluntarily transformed into the corporate structure of PMCs and they do not 
appreciate any maverick operators disrupting the modern military and security 
support market). 
 125. See DAVIS, supra note 67, at 73-75 (separating the legitimate PMC 
employee, who is a professional soldier and works for a recognized government, 
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b. State Practice and Laws Accept the Use of PMCs but Disavow Lone 
Operators 
The limiting effects of the restrictive definitions of Article 47 and 
the U.N. Convention frustrates the view of the international 
community that states retain the authority to use PMCs for specific 
tasks in the same way that auxiliary groups were permissibly used 
for hundreds of years.126 Examining international practice, it is clear 
that many states employ PMCs,127 but at the same time profess to 
discourage or even outlaw mercenaries.128  States worldwide 
continue to seek legitimate military assistance from PMCs,129 
including states that strongly opposed mercenaries in the past.130
The distinguishing factor is that the mercenaries in the 1960s, that 
gave rise to the Article 47 and U.N. Convention definitions, were a 
from the “freebooter,” an international criminal that does not obey the laws of war, 
Geneva Conventions, and International Declaration of Human Rights and 
Freedoms); see also U.N. Special Rapporteur 2004 Report, supra note 107, ¶ 43(f) 
(proposing a new, narrower definition of mercenary as simply one who offers 
professional military services for criminal activity). 
 126. See DAVIS, supra note 67, at 68-71 (arguing that PMCs are private 
organizations with antecedents in many specialist groups for hire throughout 
history); SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 172-73 (theorizing that 
modern warfare may become like the medieval era where certain tasks such as 
artillery and engineering were outsourced to specialists). 
 127. See U.K. GREEN PAPER, supra note 36, at 13, 19 (reporting that it has been, 
and will continue to be, British government policy to outsource defense functions, 
remarking on the increasing trend of governments to turn towards private 
assistance if U.N. intervention is not available and observing that even the U.N. 
and NGOs have used PMCs for logistics and security in dangerous regions); see 
also WALLWORK, supra note 45, at 22, 42 (commenting that the use of PMCs is 
becoming widely acceptable and pointing out that the Department of Defense 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review stated that the United States would continue to 
outsource functions to private firms). 
 128. See U.K. GREEN PAPER, supra note 36, Annex B (describing the laws of 
states across the world that cover the recruitment of mercenaries and criminal 
activity linked to mercenaries, but also noting that the only nations with laws 
specifically identifying PMCs are the United States and South Africa); U.N. 
Special Rapporteur 1997 Report, supra note 62, ¶ 78 (emphasizing that the General 
Assembly has repeatedly issued resolutions condemning mercenary activity). 
 129. See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 9 (observing that 
PMCs have operated on every continent except Antarctica). 
 130. See Zarate, supra note 109, at 140-41 (remarking that African states such as 
Angola, Nigeria, and Ghana that suffered predations from mercenaries in the 
1970s, apparently do not consider today’s PMCs equivalent to mercenaries, and 
have said they are quite pleased with PMC services). 
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threat to stability because they were free from any constraining 
system.131 However, PMCs are constrained in their role as 
international businesses to engage in only legitimate business 
actions, at least if they wish to remain legally recognized 
corporations. Groups attempting to operate in the ad hoc manner of 
the mercenaries of the 1970s have consistently failed in the modern 
era.132 In contrast to temporary and informal mercenary groups, 
PMCs are distinguishable by their corporate structure, which requires 
registration in some origin state, and an ongoing public face.133 
Furthermore, PMCs gain their legitimacy from working only on 
legitimate contracts.134
The general trend of domestic laws across the world demonstrates 
that states retain legal authority for the use of violence, and PMCs 
are only legitimate actors when authorized by a state.135 A number of 
states have laws restricting their citizens from serving as mercenaries 
abroad, and prohibiting the recruitment of mercenaries on their 
territory.136 Furthermore, states that do not have laws specifically 
 131. See generally U.N. Special Rapporteur 1997 Report, supra note 55, ¶ 77 
(explaining that international law has sought to condemn mercenary activity as the 
procurement of criminal services that violate human rights). 
 132. See WALLWORK, supra note 45, at 58 (arguing that authorities are more 
vigilant today in guarding against the independent mercenary gangs that may 
thwart a state’s stability, as demonstrated by the capture and conviction of a gang 
of mercenaries that sought to undermine the government of Equatorial Guinea in 
2004). 
 133. See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 46 (remarking that 
PMCs are registered legal entities in their home state, unlike the temporary 
collection of individuals that made up mercenary bands in the 1970s, and that 
PMCs operate in the open, while mercenaries attempt to hide from the law). 
 134. See KINSEY, supra note 32, at 65 (emphasizing that PMCs have further 
distinguished themselves from the 1970s mercenary figure by only accepting 
legally constituted work from legitimate clients); Zarate, supra note 109, at 125 
(arguing that a mercenary is really determined by the mission for which the 
mercenary is employed, and thus the legitimacy of a PMC is intact as long as the 
employer is legitimate and the mission does not conflict with the state-based 
international system). 
 135. See Zarate, supra note 109, at 134 (stressing that by the nineteenth century, 
over one third of states had enacted laws restricting private violence abroad, with 
the intention of separating the state from the actions of individuals, and thus PMC 
actions are only acceptable when state-sanctioned). 
 136. See U.K. GREEN PAPER, supra note 36, at 39-43 (providing an overview of 
domestic laws of different nations that directly regulate mercenary recruitment or 
mercenary service by their citizens, including laws in the United States, South 
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prohibiting “mercenaries” still require government approval for 
providing any military assistance abroad.137 These laws solidify the 
central tenet of the modern state system that states hold the 
monopoly on armed violence, but may still act through agents such 
as PMCs.138 States treat PMCs as legitimate business actors tied by a 
contract to a state and distinct from the independent mercenary who 
acts as a criminal by international standards.139
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Article 47 and U.N. Convention terms for mercenaries are 
unworkable, tainted by Cold War political motivations, and states do 
not recognize them as international law applicable to PMCs.140 
Instead, customary international law demonstrates that states accept 
PMCs even while condemning the individual mercenary.141 The 
Africa, Australia, Canada, Finland, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Russia, Ukraine, and Switzerland with the sole exception of the Vatican 
Swiss Guard). A number of other states have laws that may apply to mercenary 
activities, at least in the context of actions by citizens that damage state neutrality, 
including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden. Id. at 40-43. 
 137. See Zarate, supra note 109, at 140 (commenting that many states have 
legislation that merely requires governmental approval for military assistance 
abroad, which hardly indicates a global trend on banning such assistance). 
 138. See THOMSON, supra note 21, at 82-83 (observing that state neutrality laws, 
which emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, restricted only actions 
that were not authorized by the state, meaning that state authorization is an 
extension of state legitimacy). Furthermore, the very enactment of these laws 
underlines the state’s claim of authority in controlling and dictating the proper use 
of organized violence in the modern state system. Id. 
 139. See Milliard, supra note 25, at 5 (distinguishing the legitimate use of PMCs 
by sovereign states from the condemnation of the unaffiliated mercenary individual 
in Africa that sparked the creation of Article 47 and the U.N. Convention); see also 
THOMSON, supra note 21, at 107-08 (explaining that while state-sponsored piracy 
had been customary for hundreds of years, piracy only became illegitimate when 
states withdrew their authorization, thus emphasizing that the legitimate authority 
for violent acts rests solely with the state). 
 140. See supra Part II.B (discussing the impact of the global political 
environment at the time of the drafting of the international agreements on 
mercenaries); Part III.B.1 (remarking on the lack of worldwide support for the 
international agreements on mercenaries and the inconsistencies with actual state 
practice). 
 141. See supra Part III.B.2 (distinguishing the legitimacy of PMCs when 
authorized by a state from the unauthorized selling of military services that 
undermine the state-based international system). 
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international community should create a new international agreement 
that better reflects the practice of state use of PMCs, while keeping 
the illegitimate, criminal mercenary separate. As the United States 
becomes further embroiled in contingency operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and in light of the revealed deficiencies in holding 
PMCs accountable there, the United States must lead the 
international community in developing a global regime for PMCs. 
A. THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON 
PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE WOULD 
HARMONIZE INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND SERVE AS THE 
BASELINE FOR DOMESTIC STANDARDS 
PMCs have escaped regulation under international agreements 
because PMCs can avoid the Article 47 and U.N. Convention 
definitions of mercenaries.142 The international community should 
create a new international convention on PMCs that codifies the 
practice of using PMCs for legitimate state support. The convention 
should include all types of private military and security support 
provided to a state, and not just contracts with a state’s military. 
1. The Convention Should Cover All Direct and Indirect  
Military and Security Assistance 
One American commentator has proposed a draft international 
convention that is similar to South African law, in that it focuses on 
certain activities rather than a person’s status, and it defines the 
regulated activities broadly.143 However, the proposed convention 
still suffers from the same failing as the South African law: it still 
does not cover security forces hired by a part of the government 
other than the military.144 Because modern conflict blurs the support 
and combat roles, a new regime must regulate all PMC support 
 142. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the different clauses in the international 
definitions of mercenaries and how failure to meet all the requirements means the 
cumulative definition will not apply). 
 143. See Milliard, supra note 25, at 81-82 (using a broad definition of “military 
services” because combat and non-combat functions blend together in practice). 
 144. See id. at 80-83 (proposing that a licensed provider be allowed to contract 
with and provide services to a foreign armed force, but neglecting to include any 
provisions on contracting with other foreign agencies). 
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regardless of which government agency has hired the PMC.145 Any 
regulation that focuses only on military assistance still ignores the 
use of private security forces as bodyguards on non-military 
contracts,146 precisely the role played by Blackwater and Unity for 
the U.S. State Department in Iraq.147 This distinction of protective 
security functions provided by PMCs like Blackwater from support 
to the military by other PMCs is practically meaningless on the 
ground.148 Furthermore, the convention should recognize the 
complexities of modern conflict by covering any activity that 
contributes to inflicting harm on the enemy, regardless of the 
distance from a battlefield.149 Thus, the convention should cover 
PMC personnel involved in operating remote weapon systems, 
intelligence gathering, and even logistics.150 The convention should 
not prohibit PMCs from engaging in these activities, but require 
vetting by an international body to establish their legitimacy. 
 145. See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 50, at 537 
(commenting that the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act applies only to 
contractors with the Department of Defense, and not to PMCs working for 
intelligence agencies or even foreign governments and organizations). 
 146. See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 240 (calling for 
oversight of PMCs to be a multi-agency affair because of the different government 
agencies that use PMCs). 
 147. See SINGER, CAN’T WIN WITH ‘EM, supra note 43, at 1 (commenting that 
the State Department uses PMCs because they do not have enough Diplomatic 
Security personnel). 
 148. See id. at 6, 16 (commenting that particularly in contingency operations 
such as Iraq, there are no real frontlines, and any type of armed contractor support 
cannot be divided into defensive or offensive and noting that Iraqi citizens do not 
differentiate between PMCs and the American military); see also Elsea et al., 
supra note 44, at 13 (reporting that the PMC Blackwater’s actions frequently 
undermine the relationships the U.S. military seeks to build with the Iraqis). 
 149. See AVANT, supra note 34, at 21-22 (arguing that in actual practice, even 
PMCs hired in Iraq for non-combat roles have found their work spilling over into 
other types of roles, making it difficult to distinguish these roles from combat, 
particularly in the midst of the insurgency). 
 150. See id. at 19 (noting that as modern weapon systems have become more 
complex, it has become common to find contractors actually accompanying armed 
forces in the field to support or even operate weapon and information systems 
themselves). 
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2. The Convention Should Specifically Require PMCs to 
 Adhere to the Laws of War 
The convention should explicitly require PMCs to adhere to the 
rules of the laws of war, humanitarian law, and international criminal 
law.151 Furthermore, the convention should require that PMCs only 
work for recognized governments or internationally accepted 
movements for self determination.152 Only association with a state or 
emerging state through contract marks a PMC as a legitimate 
actor.153 A PMC that fails to obey the provisions of the convention 
should lose its approved PMC operator license. 
3. The PMC Convention Should Require Registration 
 and Licensing for PMCs to Establish Legitimacy 
The licensing process should clearly distinguish the legitimate 
PMC from the lone mercenary in the eyes of the international 
community, by vetting the backgrounds of the PMC’s employees.154 
The international community should shun any PMC that does not go 
through the licensing process,155 although some countries may chose 
to ignore the requirements of international registration and hire non-
 151. See U.K. GREEN PAPER, supra note 36, at 17 (noting that mercenaries are 
often charged with human rights abuses, but PMCs, as legally registered 
companies, must avoid such behavior or they will put themselves out of business); 
SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 241 (noting that requiring 
PMCs to undergo human rights background checks will both enhance their 
legitimacy and ease the concerns of the U.N. and humanitarian groups when they 
need to hire PMCs for protection and logistics). 
 152. See Milliard, supra note 25, at 76 (noting that the real danger of mercenary 
activity lies in the unregulated transfer of military services, and that the only 
legitimate exchange of PMC services should be between states or a group that has 
legitimate international recognition). 
 153. See AVANT, supra note 34, at 66 (positing that the development of the 
modern state system made any non-state violence illegitimate); Milliard, supra 
note 33, at 77 (noting that selling military services without the backing of state 
legitimacy is an unlawful act because it upsets the state monopoly over organized 
violence). 
 154. See U.N. Special Rapporteur 1997 Report, supra note 55, ¶ 121 (noting that 
PMCs must be careful about who they hire, because the individuals may have been 
mercenaries in the past). 
 155. See AVANT, supra note 34, at 67 (emphasizing the market power of states 
to influence PMC behavior by hiring certain PMCs over others and thereby 
encouraging the PMCs to abide by regulatory controls in order to receive future 
work). 
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accredited PMCs at their peril.156 But those states run the risk of 
becoming tainted by the actions of PMCs on their behalf that may 
reflect poorly on the state.157 It is also in a PMC’s interest to become 
internationally licensed so the PMC may present the license as a 
clear, international approval of the PMC, distinguishing it from the 
illegal operator.158 Furthermore, if PMCs choose not to seek a 
license, the stigma of being an unaccredited PMC could have an 
impact on their global business.159 It is also in the interest of the 
PMCs themselves to have a uniform, international standard rather 
than risk the uneven application of laws to their employees in 
different countries.160
4. The U.S. Must Champion the Initiative 
 to Draft a PMC Convention 
The absence of U.S. support for the 1977 and 1989 definitions of 
mercenaries has only weakened the impact of the resulting 
international conventions.161 Since the flood of private military firms 
is a result of the build up of Cold War forces, and the consequent 
draw down of military forces during the 1990s, it is vital that the 
 156. See id. at 130 (contrasting the use of well established PMCs that draw 
employees from western military veterans and represent the social and 
international values engrained by western military training, such as respect for 
human rights and civilian oversight of the military, with the use of less 
professional PMCs). The hiring of less professional PMCs runs the risk of driving 
the real professionals from the market. Id. at 131. 
 157. See Milliard, supra note 25, at 77-78 (arguing that since PMCs derive their 
real authority in the international system from a state, any unlawful actions by 
PMCs can be tracked back to the state and cause the state embarrassment). 
 158. See Zarate, supra note 109, at 152-53 (noting that regulation of PMCs, by 
clearly isolating the illegitimate mercenaries, will allow PMCs to further 
distinguish themselves from those who give the industry a bad name). 
 159. Cf. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 236 (remarking that 
the sex crimes committed by the personnel of the PMC DynCorp while in the 
Balkans still continue to haunt that corporation’s global image). 
 160. See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 50, at 542 
(commenting that without an international standard, a PMC employee may lose the 
protections of international humanitarian law and be tried as a criminal rather than 
a war combatant). 
 161. See Zarate, supra note 109, at 137 (criticizing the lack of political will in 
the United States to support laws on mercenary activity because it may lead to 
prosecution of U.S. citizens abroad). Zarate remarks that this must be why the 
United States has not prosecuted any private security companies. Id. at 137. 
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United States, its allies, and the former Soviet Bloc states take the 
forefront of revising international law.162 The U.S. failure to 
implement a strict domestic licensing and oversight regime 
regulating the PMCs accompanying military forces weakens the 
effect of any U.S. law.163 In particular, the United States should take 
the lead in an international solution because of the highly visible 
problems in Iraq with private military firms that are working for U.S. 
government agencies.164 Furthermore, the support of major state 
powers like the United States and its allies will ensure the new 
convention is speedily implemented, and does not sit idle for decades 
like the U.N. Convention.165
5. New Domestic Laws Should Stem from the  
New International Framework 
In the absence of solid international support for the Article 47 and 
U.N. Convention definitions to apply to PMCs, the only recourse for 
PMC regulation is domestic regimes.166 Furthermore, because PMCs 
operate abroad in conflict areas, only domestic regulation with 
extraterritorial jurisdiction will affect them.167 However, even U.S. 
 162. See AVANT, supra note 34, at 30-31 (arguing that not only did the 
drawdown of Cold War forces increase the supply side of the PMC market, but the 
demand side increased when other countries looked to PMCs to upgrade their 
militaries to join western institutions or when other regimes hired PMCs to make 
up for losing the support of their former Cold War patrons). 
 163. See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 238-39 (remarking 
that the only oversight applicable to PMCs in the United States is licensing under 
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, but after a license is granted, there is 
no effective oversight of how the PMC operates on a daily basis). 
 164. See SINGER, CAN’T WIN WITH ‘EM, supra note 43, at 15 (arguing that the 
controversies over PMCs in Iraq have undermined U.S. counter-insurgency efforts 
and damaged overall U.S. strategy in the region). 
 165. See KINSEY, supra note 32, at 156 (noting pessimistically that the 1989 
Convention was drafted fourteen years after the mercenary incidents in Angola, 
and then took another twelve years to be ratified by enough signatory countries to 
come into effect in 2001). 
 166. See Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law, supra note 50, at 536-37 
(lamenting that the few domestic laws that even recognize the existence of PMCs 
just defer to the international level). 
 167. See id. at 535-36 (recognizing that the conflict-ridden nations PMCs 
operate in may lack the power to regulate a foreign company and so any regulation 
must come from the firm’s home state). States often lack the sources on the ground 
to report on PMCs violating the laws of their home state. Id. at 556. 
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domestic law has been revealed to be insufficient, and the impact of 
the revised UCMJ is an open question because the legality, and 
indeed the constitutionality, of applying military law to U.S. civilians 
has yet to be tested.168 It is questionable whether current U.S. 
domestic laws can hold PMC employees accountable for crimes 
committed in Iraq.169
Any U.S. attempt to regulate PMCs in the wake of the Blackwater 
incident will only affect U.S. firms, which ignores the plethora of 
foreign PMCs in the world market.170 A new international 
convention on PMCs will allow all states to base their new domestic 
laws on the baseline rules of PMCs included in the global 
instrument.171 Domestic laws can build upon the convention 
requirements of adherence to the laws of war, humanitarian law, and 
international criminal law with the addition of particular rules for 
that state.172 The convention should stipulate that domestic laws can 
only add to, not take away, from the rights and duties of PMCs. 
Therefore, the PMC employees will also be protected because they 
know state domestic laws will be relatively consistent worldwide.173
 168. See Elsea et al., supra note 44, at 26-27 (observing that subjecting U.S. 
civilians to military court martial may violate Constitutional due process). 
 169. Cf. id. at 19 (remarking that with CPA Order 17 granting immunity to 
PMCs from prosecution under Iraqi law, and in the absence of international laws 
on PMCs, U.S. domestic law is the only law potentially applicable to PMCs). The 
recently signed SOFA does not fully address these problems, as there are still 
loopholes regarding contractors who do not work for the military. See Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal 
of U.S. Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their 
Temporary Presence in Iraq, supra note 47.  
 170. See SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS, supra note 20, at 241 (arguing that a 
“globalized industry demands a globalized response”). 
 171. See Milliard, supra note 25, at 84 (arguing that no matter how strong a 
state’s domestic regulations are, without an international standard PMCs will 
always have some incentive to relocate to states with weaker regulations); see also 
KINSEY, supra note 40, at 139 (observing that one of the most controversial PMCs, 
Executive Outcomes, simply relocated outside of South Africa to avoid the impact 
of domestic laws). 
 172. See Elsea et al., supra note 44, at 16 (remarking that because of the legal 
uncertainty over PMCs operating outside the military chain of command, their 
employees may not be entitled to POW status, though they may meet all other 
criteria for a combatant). 
 173. Cf. KINSEY, supra note 32, at 155 (commenting that all governments have 
an interest in protecting their citizens working abroad for a foreign firm from 
prosecution under foreign laws). 
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CONCLUSION 
PMCs are global businesses that demand a uniform, global 
standard. In light of the ongoing operations in Iraq, and the shooting 
of Iraqi civilians by PMCs that have revealed deficiencies in PMC 
accountability, the international community must finally create a 
standard language for dealing with these companies. The 
international community should establish an international body with 
licensing and oversight powers. As the nation is embroiled with 
PMCs in Iraq, the United States must lead this international initiative 
to give the global effort legitimacy. 
 
